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BALANCING INTERESTS IN FREE TRADE
AND HEALTH: HOW THE WHO’S
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO
CONTROL CAN WITHSTAND WTO SCRUTINY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Tobacco is one of the most widely consumed products in the
world, and yet it has an extremely negative impact on human health.
Worldwide, one in three adults, or approximately 1.1 billion people,
smoke or consume other tobacco products, and between 82,000 and
99,000 young people take up smoking every day.1 By the year 2020, it
is projected that more people will die from tobacco-related diseases
than from any other single disease.2 In response to this, the World
Health Organization (WHO) has established an ambitious goal: gen3
erate a treaty regime to reduce tobacco consumption. In 1999, the
WHO’s legislative body, the World Health Assembly (WHA),
unanimously passed an unprecedented resolution to convene negotiations for the development of The Framework Convention for Tobacco Control (FCTC), to be adopted by 2003.4 The FCTC will be
the first instrument in an incrementally developed regime whereby
states ratify a framework convention and subsequent protocols designed to reduce the consumption of tobacco.5 The FCTC and followup protocols will focus on measures to facilitate international coop-
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* The author would like to thank Professor Michael Byers and the staff of the Duke Journal of
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1. THE WORLD BANK, CURBING THE EPIDEMIC: GOVERNMENTS AND THE ECONOMICS
OF TOBACCO CONTROL 13, 19 (1999) [hereinafter CURBING THE EPIDEMIC].
2. Christopher J. L. Murray & Alan D. Lopez, Alternative Projections of Mortality and
Disability by Cause 1999–2020: Global Burden of Disease Study, 349 THE LANCET 1498, 1502
(1997).
3. For an early discussion of strategies of treaty-based tobacco control and the potential
role of the WHO, see generally Allyn Taylor, An International Regulatory Strategy for Global
Tobacco Control, 21 YALE J. INT’L. L. 257 (1996).
4. WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY, WHA Doc. 52.18 (May 24, 1999).
5. For a recent discussion of WHO plans to develop the FCTC, see Allyn L. Taylor &
Douglas W. Bettcher, WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: a global “good” for
public health, 78 BULL. OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORG. 920 (2000).
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eration and will place signatory nations under obligations to enact
6
domestic legislation that will curb tobacco consumption. Among the
measures contemplated, there are several that will relate to international trade obligations.7 For example, Article F of the current draft
of the FCTC (Draft FCTC or Draft Convention) would encourage,
but not require, signatory nations to eliminate duty-free sales of tobacco products and to increase taxes on tobacco products in order to
8
reduce consumer demand.
Tobacco control measures such as these are sure to draw criticism from the tobacco industry, which has consistently resisted regu9
lation for decades, as well as countries that rely on tobacco production for economic stability.10 Additionally, it is likely that states that
are major stakeholders in the tobacco industry and those that are
home to powerful tobacco companies11 will choose to challenge tobacco control measures adopted by an FCTC signatory as a violation
of the free trade rules enforced by the World Trade Organization
(WTO). The WTO, a robust international institution with a membership of over 140 states, has built a reputation as a zealous defender of
the free trade regime.12 In its relatively short history, the WTO, like
the dispute settlement panels that operated under the WTO’s predecessor, the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT), has
6. World Heath Organization, Chair’s Text of a Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, WHO Doc. A/FCTC/INB2/2 (Jan. 9, 2001), available at http://www.who.int/gb/fctc/inb2/
PDFinb2/e2inb2.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2001) [hereinafter Draft FCTC].
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. A review of internal corporate documents reveals that as early as 1953, U.S. tobacco
executives recognized that their industry was threatened by adverse medical research and regulation and, in response, they jointly hired public relations consultants to help allay public concern and to resist government regulation. Yussuf Saloojee & Elif Dagli, Tobacco industry tactics
for resisting public policy on health, 78 BULL. OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORG. 902, 903–04
(2000).
10. For example, there may be resistance from the two countries for which tobacco generates a significant percentage of export earnings: Malawi (sixty-one percent) and Zimbabwe
(twenty-three percent). CURBING THE EPIDEMIC, supra note 1, at 58.
11. The state-owned China National Tobacco Corporation, the world’s most prolific cigarette producer, generated 24.6 percent of the world’s cigarettes in 1997, while the second largest
producer, Philip Morris, generated 13.7 percent. THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION,
WORLD HEALTH REPORT 1999, at 71 (1999). The World Bank reports that forty-two percent of
the world’s tobacco was produced in China in 1997, while only 9.3 percent was produced in the
United States. CURBING THE EPIDEMIC, supra note 1, at 58.
12. As of mid-December 2001, there were 143 WTO member states and thirty-three states,
including the Russian Federation, that are not yet full members, but have observer status. The
status of member and observer states is available on the WTO web site,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2001).

ECKHARDT_FMT.DOC

2002]

BALANCING INTERESTS IN FREE TRADE AND HEALTH

01/24/02 9:25 AM

199

consistently struck down state-sponsored measures which were ostensibly designed to protect human health or the environment when it
found that such measures conflicted with free trade rules.13 Accordingly, the WHO and other promoters of the tobacco control regime
must direct their efforts carefully in promulgating the FCTC and follow-up protocols, in order to avoid conflicts with WTO-enforced free
trade rules.
This paper discusses free trade principles and the prospects of
developing an effective, global, tobacco control regime that is compatible with free trade rules. In order to understand why the WHO is
promoting the FCTC, it is important to discuss briefly the impact of
tobacco consumption. In terms of the economic impact of tobacco,
the World Bank recently concluded that while it is difficult both to
identify and quantify the impact on society, smokers do not bear the
sum of the costs of their choice to smoke, and furthermore, smokers
impose health and financial costs onto the nonsmoking portion of so14
ciety. Worldwide, tobacco consumption currently causes four million deaths annually, and it is estimated that by the year 2030, ten
million people per year will die of tobacco-related diseases including
lung cancer, emphysema, and heart disease.15 Moreover, an important shift in the tobacco problem is occurring: in the developing
world, where domestic regulation is typically weak, tobacco consumption is increasing even while it decreases in the developed world. It is
projected that seven of every ten tobacco-caused deaths will occur in
developing countries by the year 2030.16 Bearing these figures in
mind, it is not surprising that the WHO has embarked on a mission to
develop a tobacco control regime.
The following discussion of the relationship between trade rules
and the future tobacco control regime is divided into four sections.
Section One outlines the basic principles of free trade, including the
relevant trade agreements administrated by the WTO, in particular
17
the 1947 GATT and the agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
18
(TBT). A discussion of trade cases that illuminate these principles
13. See discussion infra section III.
14. CURBING THE EPIDEMIC, supra note 1, at 34.
15. Id. at 22, 24.
16. Id. at 23.
17. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
18. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS−RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994) [hereinafter TBT]. The full text of the agreement is available
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follows, and the section concludes with an analysis of the potential
impact of the WTO free trade regime on tobacco control measures.
Section Two includes an explanation of the tobacco control regime
that the WHO is working to develop, including the FCTC, possible
follow-up protocols, and a brief report on the progress of the FCTC.
Section Three addresses each general category of tobacco control
measure from the Draft FCTC that might conflict with free trade obligations, along with recommendations for drafting WTO-compliant
tobacco control measures. The final section of this paper briefly
analyzes the above sections and draws the following conclusions: the
WTO agreements do not preclude effective development of a tobacco
control regime; the current Draft FCTC does not conflict with free
trade rules; and lastly, with careful and strategic planning, the WHO
can develop effective, WTO-compliant, trade-related tobacco control
measures for later FCTC protocols.
II. PRINCIPLES OF FREE TRADE
A. Development of the WTO, a Free Trade Institution
In 1817, the economist David Ricardo first articulated the theory
that is fundamental to the principles of free trade law: comparative
19
advantage. According to this theory, in a world where governments
put up no, or minimal, barriers to trade, efficient producers in each
region will grow and expand production, capitalizing on their comparative advantage in the market, while inefficient producers will
drop out, feeding the local efficient producers’ demand for workers
and resources.20 Comparative advantage is “a powerful intellectual
underpinning” of international economic law, in general, and of the
21
1947 GATT. The GATT was to be administrated by the International Trade Organization (ITO), a stillborn sibling of the two betterknown Bretton Woods institutions, the International Monetary Fund
22
(IMF) and the World Bank. Although the ITO never came into existence, the GATT was a largely successful regime throughout the

on the WTO website, http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt.pdf (last visited Nov. 16,
2001).
19. For a brief discussion of the theory and international economic law in general, see
JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 14–20 (2d ed. 1997, 3rd prtg. 1999).
20. Id. at 16.
21. Id. at 15.
22. Id. at 30–38.
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cold war even though it lacked an implementing organization or an
23
effective enforcement mechanism. In the years just after the cold
24
war, the WTO was developed. The WTO still uses the rules of the
original 1947 GATT, along with Supplementary Agreements and
strengthened enforcement via a binding dispute settlement procedure. 25
B. The Free Trade Agreements
1. The GATT. The promotion of free trade is based on several
principles that are embodied in the GATT rules. In the context of the
prospective tobacco control regime, the most relevant provisions are
Articles I, III, and XI. Article I of the GATT grants most favored nation status, according the right of equal treatment to all like products
26
from any signatory nation. In other words, a signatory country may
not treat imports from one member state differently than imports of
another member state. Article III provides that like products im27
ported from a member state should be granted “national treatment,”
meaning that regulatory standards, taxes, and any other governmental
restrictions must not discriminate between imported and domestic
products. Article XI forbids quantitative restrictions on imports, including quotas and import or export licenses.28 In general, member
23. Under the GATT dispute settlement procedure, consensus of the contracting parties
was required in order to adopt a panel report, essentially granting the losing party in a dispute
the power to veto an unfavorable report. Under the current dispute settlement process, a panel
report is automatically adopted unless there is consensus among the contracting parties to not
adopt the report. JACKSON, supra note 19, at 125.
24. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1
(1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
25. JACKSON, supra note 19, at 47.
26. Article I:1 of the GATT provides that “any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity
granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country
shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined
for the territories of all other contracting parties.” GATT, supra note 17, art. I(1).
27. The first sentence of Article III:2 explains that
[t]he products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of
any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.
GATT, supra note 17, art. III:2.
28. Section 1 of Article XI provides:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made
effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the
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states can make claims against other members if they suffer at the
hands of another state that is violating any one of the above provisions. If there is no apparent violation of any other article of the
GATT, members can make claims under Article XXIII on nullifica29
tion or impairment. Article XXIII allows a party to seek a judgment
against another member state even if the opposing state has not specifically violated any GATT provision, but has still enacted some
measure that impairs or nullifies the other’s ability to enjoy the benefits of the treaty.30
While the majority of the GATT provisions are aimed at forbidding protectionism and trade-restrictive measures, there are exceptions in the agreement that allow the development and implementation of legitimate, but trade-restrictive, measures.
The most
undisputed exception is the Article XXI national security exception,
which allows states to violate free trade obligations in order to protect
31
their basic sovereignty. Article XX sets out a series of different exceptions that allow states to adopt WTO-inconsistent measures, including section (b), which allows for measures that protect animal,
32
plant, or human life and health. Since it is possible that many tobacco control measures may impede free trade, it is important that
the WHO and tobacco control promoters understand the language of
the Article XX(b) exception. Article XX(b) has two parts, the heading, or “chapeau,” and a following subsection. Read together, the
chapeau and subsection (b) are as follows:

territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any
product destined for the territory of any other contracting party.
GATT, supra note 17, art. XI.
29. Article XXIII provides:
[I]f any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of
any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the result of
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations under this
Agreement, or
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it
conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or
(c) the existence of any other situation,
the contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of the matter,
make written representations or proposals to the other contracting party or parties
which it considers to be concerned. Any contracting party thus approached shall give
sympathetic consideration to the representations or proposals made to it.”
GATT, supra note 17, art. XXIII(1).
30. Id.
31. Id. art. XXI; JACKSON, supra note 19, at 229.
32. GATT, supra note 17, art. XX.
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Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in
this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: . . . (b) necessary
33
to protect human, animal or plant life or health.

The Article XX(b) exception has been employed in a series of GATT
and WTO cases, but, until recently, attempts to utilize the exception
to excuse trade restrictive measures aimed at protecting health or the
34
environment have failed. The major trade cases where an Article
XX(b) exception defense has been rejected are discussed below, followed by an analysis of a recent case regarding the French ban on as35
bestos products. In that case, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
panel accepted France’s application of the Article XX(b) exception to
defend its ban on asbestos as a reasonable measure to protect human
36
health. The Appellate Body upheld the panel’s finding that France
could place a ban on asbestos.37 The significance of the Appellate
Body and panel reports in the asbestos case are discussed below.38
2. The WTO Supplementary Agreements. The Uruguay Round
produced a remarkable number of agreements, decisions, and declarations that work in conjunction with the GATT. Regarding the prospective tobacco regime, the most notable of the agreements include
the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
39
Measures (SPS), the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of In-

33. Id. art. XX(b).
34. For recent discussions of the Article XX(b) exception and related trade cases, see generally Virginia Dailey, Sustainable Development: Reevaluating the Trade vs. Turtles Conflict at
the WTO, 9 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 331 (2000); Ala’I Padideh, Free Trade or Sustainable
Development? An Analysis of the WTO Appellate Body’s Shift to a More Balanced Approach to
Trade Liberalization, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1129 (1999).
35. Infra section III.
36. WTO Dispute Settlement Body Panel Report on EC Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/R (00-3353), 2000 WTO DS LEXIS 30 (Sept. 18,
2000), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/distab_e.htm (last visited Nov.
16, 2001) [hereinafter WTO Asbestos Dispute Settlement Body Panel Report].
37. WTO Appellate Body Report on EC Measures Affecting Asbestos and AsbestosContaining Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (March 12, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/dispu_e/135abr_e.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2001) [hereinafter WTO Asbestos
Appellate Body Report].
38. Infra section III F.
39. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, LEGAL
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tellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),40 and the Agreement on Techni41
cal Barriers to Trade (TBT). In general, the SPS agreement regulates the measures member states can take to protect plant, animal,
and human health from diseases and pests, as well as measures to en42
sure safe food and beverages. The SPS agreement includes language
that touches on themes that would seem to relate to the tobacco control regime, but the SPS agreement is not applicable because tobacco
43
products cannot be considered food or “disease causing organisms.”
The TRIPS agreement poses many questions regarding the conflict of
health policy versus free trade in regards to drug patents.44 However,
it is not likely that the tobacco control regime will be developed in a
manner that would compromise intellectual property rights of tobacco producers; thus, the TRIPS agreement itself will not likely be at
45
issue for development of the FCTC. The TBT agreement is more
relevant because it deals with technical regulations and standards and
the FCTC contains various tobacco control measures that would imINSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), available at http://www.wto.
org/english/docs_e/legal_e/15-sps.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2001) [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
40. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).
41. TBT, supra note 18.
42. SPS Agreement, supra note 39.
43. Measures governed by the SPS Agreement are defined in Annex A as measures applied:
(a) to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the Member from
risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease-carrying
organisms or disease-causing organisms; (b) to protect human or animal life or health
within the territory of the Member from risks arising from additives, contaminants,
toxins or disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages or feedstuffs; (c) to protect
human life or health within the territory of the Member from risks arising from diseases carried by animals, plants or products thereof, or from the entry, establishment
or spread of pests; or (d) to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the
Member from the entry, establishment or spread of pests.
Id.
44. The WTO recently acted to help settle this issue, releasing a declaration at the WTO
Ministerial Conference in November 2001. Article 4 of the Declaration stated:
We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from
taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect
public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.
WTO Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/2, art. 4
(Nov. 14, 2001), available at http://www-chil.wto-ministerial.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/
min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2001).
45. For a brief discussion of the conflict regarding international intellectual property rights
and health policy, especially HIV/AIDS, see David P. Fidler, Neither Science Nor Shamans:
Globalization of Markets and Health in the Developing World, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
191, 209–13 (1999).
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pose regulations, from labeling requirements to regulations on the ac46
tual contents of tobacco products.
3. The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. The TBT
agreement focuses on the issue of regulations and standards for products, and aims to allow reasonable imposition of regulations that do
not excessively impede efficient production and international trade in
products, while granting member states the ability to impose regulations to protect certain interests. Article 2.2 of the Agreement provides:
Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared,
adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade. For this purpose, technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to
fulfill a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks nonfulfillment would create. Such legitimate objectives are, inter alia:
national security requirements; the prevention of deceptive practices; protection of human health or safety; animal or plant life or
health, or the environment. In assessing such risks, relevant elements of consideration are, inter alia: available scientific and technical information, related processing technology or intended end-uses
47
of products.

Additionally, the agreement establishes that it is preferable to base
technical regulations on relevant international standards. Article 2.4
of the TBT Agreement explains that member states should use international standards as a basis for their regulations unless such an ap48
plication would be ineffective or inappropriate, and Article 2.9 imposes requirements for members to give notice and allow other
members to comment when they promulgate regulations for which
there are no international standards or when the regulations differ
49
from existing standards.
III. RELEVANT GATT AND WTO DECISIONS
The above review of free trade rules illuminates a central principle that the WTO will enforce—nondiscrimination. That is, most favored nation status and national treatment rules forbid member states
from discriminating against imported products from member coun-

46.
47.
48.
49.

Draft FCTC, supra note 6, art. G:1(b).
TBT, supra note 18, art. 2.2 (emphasis added).
Id. art. 2.4.
Id. art. 2.9.
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tries, or from discriminating against imported products generally.50
However, both the GATT and the TBT contemplate exceptions for
measures to protect human health. The GATT Article XX(b) exception is allowed so long as there is no “arbitrary or unjustified discrimination” or “a disguised restriction on international trade,” and
as long as the health measure is “necessary.”51 Article 2.2 of the TBT
has slightly different language, allowing “legitimate” exceptions that
52
do not create “unnecessary obstacles to trade.” In order to better
understand the principles of free trade obligations and, more importantly, the criteria for successfully applying exceptions like Article
XX(b), several relevant trade cases are discussed below.
A. GATT Panel Decision: Thailand Cigarettes
In 1966, the government of Thailand passed the Tobacco Act,
53
which forbade tobacco imports without a license. In the decade preceding the dispute in question, Thailand had granted no import licenses, prompting the United States to file a complaint with the
GATT.54 The United States requested that the GATT panel find the
restriction on cigarette imports a violation of GATT Article XI:1 on
quantitative restrictions, and argued, inter alia, that the Article XX(b)
exception did not apply.55 Thailand countered that Article XX(b) applied because the prohibition on cigarettes was an “objective of public
56
health policy.” In reaching its decision, the GATT panel sought advice from the WHO on the actual impact of cigarette consumption,57
and in its findings, the panel acknowledged that “smoking constituted
a serious risk to human health and that consequently, measures designed to reduce the consumption of cigarettes [fall] within the scope

50. See GATT, supra note 17, arts. I, III.
51. Id. art. XX(b).
52. TBT, supra note 18, art. 2.2.
53. Thailand—Restriction on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, Nov. 7,
1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200 (1991) [hereinafter GATT Thailand Cigarettes Report].
54. Id.
55. Id. at 201. Article XI:1 of the GATT states:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made
effective through quotas import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the
territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any
product destined for the territory of any other contracting party.
GATT, supra note 17, art. XI:1.
56. GATT Thailand Cigarettes Report, supra note 53, at 206.
57. Id. ¶ 50.
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of Article XX(b).”58 However, the panel noted that Article XX(b)
requires that the measure be “necessary,” and a measure to protect
health could not be considered “necessary” if a reasonable alternative
that would not conflict with free trade rules could be employed.59 The
panel suggested an alternative means to curb consumption of cigarettes based on evidence offered by the WHO that restrictions on advertising can reduce cigarette consumption: a general ban on tobacco
60
advertising by both foreign and domestic tobacco companies. Based
in part on its finding that the Thai measures to reduce tobacco consumption were not consistent with the term “necessary” found in Ar61
ticle XX(b), the panel ruled in favor of the United States. The panel
did not proceed to discuss whether the import ban was arbitrary or
unjustified discrimination, or a disguised restriction on trade.
B. GATT Panel Decision: Tuna Dolphin
In the first of two cases dealing with U.S. efforts to protect dolphins, Mexico challenged the United States for its enforcement of a
special provision of the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972
62
(MMPA). The Act prohibited the import of tuna that had been harvested by chasing and surrounding dolphins with “purse-seine” nets, a
fishing method that was effective for netting tuna, but commonly resulted in the collateral “taking” of dolphins.63 The United States invoked the Article XX(b) exception, arguing that the provision of the
MMPA was “necessary” to protect the life and health of dolphins.64
The panel found that the United States could not prove necessity because it failed to show that it had “exhausted all options reasonably
available” to devise dolphin protection measures that would be consistent with the GATT.65 Several other countries lodged additional
complaints against the United States in 1994, because the United
States had also imposed a secondary boycott on products made from

58. Id. ¶ 73.
59. Id. ¶ 74.
60. Id. ¶ 78.
61. Id. ¶ 87.
62. United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Sept. 3, 1991, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th
Supp.), at 155, 162 ¶¶ 3.1–3.5 (1993) [hereinafter GATT Tuna Dolphin Report]. The challenged provision is codified at 16 U.S.C. §§1361–1407 (1988).
63. See Tuna Dolphin Report, supra note 62, ¶ 2.2.
64. Id. ¶ 3.33.
65. Id. ¶ 5.28.
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tuna imported from countries that used purse-seine nets.66 The U.S.
plea for an exception under Article XX(b) in this case was also dismissed for failure to prove necessity.67
C. WTO Appellate Body Report: Reformulated Gasoline
With the advent of the WTO in 1995, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body was established, and shortly thereafter its highest tribunal,
the Appellate Body, reviewed a WTO panel report that involved an
68
Article XX(b) claim. Venezuela and Brazil brought a claim against
the United States for its enforcement of provisions of the Clean Air
Act, which granted domestic gasoline producers three ways to report
the quality of their gasoline while allowing importers only one costly
method.69 The Appellate Body upheld the findings of the panel generally, including the findings that the U.S. regulations violated national treatment principles under Article III of the GATT and that
the regulations could not be considered “necessary to protect hu70
man . . . life or health” under the Article XX(b) exception. The
panel conceded that “a policy to reduce air pollution resulting from
the consumption of gasoline was a policy within the range of those
concerning the protection of human, animal and plant life or
health. . . .”71 However, the panel ruled that the United States failed
to prove that its measures were “necessary,” because the application
of slightly more exacting standards to domestic and imported gasoline
would allow the United States to achieve the goal of maintaining the
desired level of clean air without discriminating against imported
gasoline.72 Additionally, the panel found that the United States had
not demonstrated that there were no other measures that could have
been enacted to enforce standards for foreign gasoline that were less
73
inconsistent with Article III. The Appellate Body made a significant
66. GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report on U.S. Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 33
I.L.M. 839, 876–86 (June 16, 1994).
67. Id. at 896–99.
68. WTO Appellate Body Report on U.S. Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, 35 I.L.M. 603, 611–13 (Apr. 29, 1996), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop
_e/dispu_e/gasoline.wp5 (last visited Oct. 22, 2001) [hereinafter WTO Reformulated Gasoline
Appellate Body Report].
69. Id.
70. GATT, supra note 17, art. XX(b); WTO Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 68, at 612.
71. WTO Dispute Panel Report on U.S. Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, 35 I.L.M. 274, 296 (Jan. 29, 1996).
72. Id. ¶ 6.27.
73. Id. ¶ 6.28.
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declaration in its holding, explaining that the WTO seeks to balance
interests in free trade and health:
It is of some importance that the Appellate Body point out what
this [ruling] does not mean. It does not mean, or imply, that the
ability of any WTO Member to take measures to control air pollution or, more generally, to protect the environment, is at issue.
That would be to ignore the fact that Article XX of the General
Agreement contains provisions designed to permit important state
interests—including the protection of human health, as well as the
74
conservation of exhaustible natural resources—to find expression.

D. WTO Appellate Body Report: Shrimp Turtle
The United States again found itself defending legislation designed to protect marine wildlife in the Shrimp Turtle dispute. India,
Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand petitioned the WTO Dispute Settlement Body to review U.S. federal legislation that prohibited the
import of shrimp from countries that typically harvested shrimp with
75
methods that killed sea turtles. The law allowed shrimp to be imported if a country could show that its shrimping fleet used turtleexcluder devices.76 The panel found that the U.S. law violated Article
XI:1 of the GATT and that the United States had failed to prove a
right to an exception under section (g) of Article XX.77 Article XX(g)
provides an exception for measures “relating to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.”78 The Appellate Body reversed the panel’s finding that the claim
under Article XX(g) failed, ruling that the turtle-protection measure
could be defended under section (g).79 The Appellate Body proceeded
to outline a second step for Article XX analysis, looking to the chapeau
80
of the article which would also apply in an Article XX(b) case. The
Appellate Body ruled that the U.S. law was a form of “unjustifiable
discrimination” because it not only required nations to adopt essen74. WTO Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 68, at 633–34.
75. WTO Appellate Body Report on U.S. Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, 38 I.L.M. 118, 118 (Oct. 12, 1998), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/58abr.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2001) [hereinafter WTO Shrimp Turtle
Appellate Body Report]. The law in question was a regulation promulgated under the
Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (1999)).
76. Id. ¶ 3.
77. Id. ¶ 7. The United States did not make an Article XX(b) claim.
78. GATT, supra note 17, at 262.
79. WTO Shrimp Turtle Appellate Body Report, supra note 75, at 157.
80. Id. ¶¶ 161–65.
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tially the same regulations as those in place in the United States, but
because it also forbade import of shrimp harvested using turtleexcluder devices, if the shrimp came from ships flagged by an uncertified country.81
E. WTO Appellate Body Report: Meat Hormones
In 1997, a dispute focusing on health related regulations arose
between Canada, the United States, and the European Community
(EC) regarding a series of EC directives that forbade the sale of imported or domestic meat derived from hormone treated farm ani82
mals. Because the regulations in question dealt with food, the Dispute Settlement Body and the Appellate Body applied the SPS
Agreement in its analysis.83 The Appellate Body ruled that the EC
had failed to show that it satisfied Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement,
which requires that measures to protect health be based on a scientific risk assessment.84 Article 2 of the SPS Agreement sets out principles much like those found in the Article XX(b) exception, allowing, to the extent necessary, measures designed to protect human
health85 and taking scientific risk assessment into account.86 Having
found that the EC did not base its regulations on any kind of risk assessment, the Appellate Body did not even proceed to make an Article 2 analysis to consider whether the ban on hormone treated meat
was a measure necessary to protect health.
F. WTO Panel Report: Asbestos
Until the year 2000, the WTO had yet to rule that any health
measure or environmental protection measure was allowable as “necessary” and justifiable discrimination under the Article XX(b) exception. The WTO finally delivered a decision allowing an application of
the Article XX(b) exception with the panel report on the French general ban on asbestos and asbestos-containing products, which found
that a violation of the Article III national treatment principle was al-

81. Id.
82. WTO Appellate Body Report on EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, (98-0099), AB-1997-4, 1998 WTO DS LEXIS 5
(Jan. 16, 1998) ¶¶ 1–3, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/hormab.pdf
(last visited Oct. 22, 2001) [hereinafter WTO Meat Hormones Appellate Body Report].
83. Id. ¶ 253.
84. Id.
85. SPS Agreement, supra note 39, art. 2.1.
86. Id. art. 2.2.
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lowed under the Article XX(b) exception.87 The Appellate Body report that followed upheld the panel’s Article XX(b) ruling, which
preserved France’s right to ban asbestos, and reversed one of the
panel’s findings that was favorable to France’s opponent in the case,
88
Canada. The asbestos dispute originated with a 1996 decree by the
French Government banning the manufacture, processing, sale, and
import of asbestos and asbestos-containing products, with the stated
89
aim of protecting the health of workers and consumers. The EC,
representing France, defended the decree on a number of grounds.
While the panel found that France’s decree did in fact violate Article
III:4 national treatment principles, it found in favor of the EC on the
basis of its Article XX(b) defense.90
The panel explained that the EC, as defending party, bore the
burden of making a prima facie case that the measure was justified,
91
and that Canada would have to rebut that case in order to prevail.
The panel then proceeded to consider four elements of the Article
XX(b) exception: it inquired whether the decree was (1) aimed at the
“protection of human life and health;” (2) whether the decree was
“necessary;” and under the chapeau of Article XX, whether the decree was (3) a “means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” or
(4) a “disguised restriction on international trade.”92 Under the first
element, Canada contended that there was insufficient scientific evidence that the type of asbestos products it manufactured posed a risk
to health.93 However, the panel found in favor of France, allowing
that “a decision-maker responsible for taking public health measures
might reasonably conclude that [asbestos-containing products] posed
a risk. . . .”94 Under the second element, the panel was convinced that
France’s decree was “necessary,” even if it might be possible to handle Canadian asbestos-containing products safely, because leaders
“might have reasonable doubts” that they could ensure safe han95
dling. Regarding the third element of the Article XX(b) test, the
panel noted that the decree was applied evenly between domestic
producers and imports, and accordingly there was no discrimination
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

WTO Asbestos Dispute Settlement Body Panel Report, supra note 36, ¶ 9.1.
See WTO Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 37, ¶ 192.
WTO Asbestos Dispute Settlement Body Panel Report, supra note 36, ¶¶ 2.3–2.5.
Id. ¶ 3.291.
Id. ¶¶ 3.244, 8.177.
Id. ¶¶ 3.474, 8.177–8.240.
Id. ¶ 3.323.
Id. ¶ 8.193.
Id. ¶ 8.211.
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to consider.96 The panel added that if discrimination had been shown,
the analysis would have proceeded to determine whether the discrimination was arbitrary or unjustified.97 On the fourth and final
element, the panel declared that because a showing of discrimination
was lacking, it was not necessary to consider whether the decree constituted a disguised restriction on trade.98 The panel report concluded
with a discussion and denial of Canada’s nullification or impairment
claim, noting that because so many similar, developed countries recognized the health risks associated with asbestos and had enacted restrictive regulations, Canada could have reasonably expected France
99
to enact similar regulations.
The Appellate Body report that followed the panel report upheld the reasoning of the panel on the Article XX(b) claim, and reversed the finding of the panel that there had been an Article III:4
100
The panel’s Article III:4 finding was
violation in the first place.
based on the theory that asbestos products were “like” other, less
harmful microfiber products.101 The Appellate Body criticized this
finding on several grounds but, most importantly, it found that the
panel should not have denied the EC’s request to include the risks
“posed by the product to human health” in the consideration of
“likeness.”102 The Appellate Body explained:
in examining the “likeness” of products, panels must evaluate all of
the relevant evidence. We are very much of the view that evidence
relating to the health risks associated with a product may be pertinent in an examination of “likeness” under Article III:4 of the
103
GATT 1994.

96. Id. ¶¶ 8.224, 8.227.
97. Id. ¶ 8.230.
98. Id. ¶ 8.237.
99. Id. ¶ 8.303.
100. WTO Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 37, ¶ 192. Article III:4 of the
GATT in its entirety provides:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of
any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of
differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the product.
GATT, supra note 17.
101. WTO Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 37, ¶ 84.
102. Id. ¶ 113.
103. Id.
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The finding of the Appellate Body that asbestos products were
not “like” alternative, less harmful products extinguished Canada’s
Article III:4 claim and ostensibly made the Article XX(b) findings of
104
the panel moot. Nevertheless, the Appellate Body upheld the Arti105
cle XX(b) findings. In its discussion of the Article XX(b) claim, the
Appellate Body addressed several of Canada’s appeals that followed
the panel report, including an argument that the EC must “quantify”
the risk associated with asbestos products in order to argue that asbestos products pose a risk to human health.106 The Appellate Body
considered Canada’s contention that the level of protection sought by
France’s decree was unreasonable, and perhaps unattainable, because
alternative products would also pose a risk to health.107 Additionally,
Canada had made an appeal that the panel erred in finding that “controlled use” of asbestos products was not a reasonable alternative to
the ban.108 The Appellate Body countered that there is no general requirement to quantify a risk to health in order to prove that a meas109
ure is “necessary.” The Appellate Body also rejected Canada’s argument that the level of protection sought by the decree was
questionable, stating, “WTO Members have the right to determine
the level of protection of health that they consider appropriate in a
given situation.”110 Regarding the claim that there were reasonable
alternatives to the ban on asbestos, the Appellate Body confirmed
that a measure will not withstand scrutiny if an alternative measure
not inconsistent with the GATT is available.111 Nonetheless the Appellate Body found:
France could not reasonably be expected to employ any alternative
measure if that measure would involve a continuation of the very
risk that the Decree seeks to ‘halt.’ Such an alternative measure
would, in effect, prevent France from achieving its chosen level of
112
health protection.

In reaching this conclusion, the Appellate Body explained that the
determination of whether a measure is “necessary” will be affected by
the importance and value of the interest protected by a given meas104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. ¶ 192.
Id.
Id. ¶ 165.
Id. ¶ 168.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 169–74.
Id. ¶ 168.
Id. ¶ 171.
Id. ¶ 174.
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ure.113 Citing language from an earlier case, the Appellate Body declared:
“the more vital or important [the] common interests or values” pursued, the easier it would be to accept as “necessary” measures designed to achieve those ends. In this case, the objective pursued by
the measure is the preservation of human life and health through
the elimination, or reduction, of the well known, and life threatening, health risks posed by asbestos fibres. The value pursued is
114
both vital and important to the highest degree.

IV. POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE WTO ON TOBACCO
CONTROL MEASURES
Protests in late 1999 and 2000 against the WTO and other institutions associated with globalization demonstrated that many activist
groups think that free trade rules are not compatible with such social
programs and policies as the WHO tobacco control initiative.115 Although anti-trade forces have been effective in stalling trade talks and
capturing the public’s attention, their allegations that free trade principles run counter to protection of human health and the environment
have been rightly criticized.116 The free trade rules and jurisprudence
reviewed above suggest that the WTO free trade regime gives ample
room to governments to promulgate tobacco control measures under
a WHO-sponsored tobacco control regime. Additionally, the WTO
has indicated to the WHO that it will support international health
regulations. At the Third Session of the United Nations Ad Hoc In-

113. Id. ¶ 172 (citing WTO Appellate Body Report on Korean Measures Affecting Imports
of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, (00-5347), AB-2000-8,
2000 WTO DS LEXIS 36, ¶ 162 (Jan. 10, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop
_e/dispu_e/161-169abr_e.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2001)) (citations omitted).
114. Id.
115. The protests at the Seattle Round of the WTO (November 1999), the World Economic
Forum in Davos, Switzerland (February 2000), and the World Bank/IMF meetings in Washington, D.C. (April 2000) were widely reported. The following articles discuss each event, as well
as the impact of the protests: Joseph Kahn & David Sanger, Trade Obstacles Unmoved, Seattle
Talks End in Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1999, at A6; The New Trade War, THE ECONOMIST,
U.S. Ed., Dec. 4, 1999, at 25–26; The World’s View of Multinationals, THE ECONOMIST, U.S.
Ed., Jan. 29, 2000, at 21–22; Today’s Pig is Tomorrow’s Bacon, THE ECONOMIST, U.S. Ed., Apr.
22, 2000, at 24.
116. New York Times commentator Thomas L. Friedman called the work of protestors in
Seattle “a fools errand,” and explained that protesting organizations could “make a difference
today using globalization—by mobilizing the power of trade.” Thomas L. Friedman, Senseless
in Seattle, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1999, at A23. For a discussion of the anti-trade movement, see
Susan Tiefenbrun, Free Trade and Protectionism: The Semiotics of Seattle, 17 ARIZ. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 257 (2000).
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teragency Task Force on Tobacco Control held in December, 2000, a
WTO representative explained:
the WTO has never put into question the level of health or environmental protection that its members have chosen to pursue.
What is sometimes put into question in the WTO is the approach
that a country takes to achieve a certain level of protection—but
not the level itself . . . . WTO rules provide significant leeway for
countries to put measures in place to protect human health and the
117
environment.

The November 2001 WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar,
reiterated in its Ministerial Declaration that the Article XX(b) exception allows countries to pursue public health objectives, stating that
“under WTO rules no country should be prevented from taking
measures for the protection of human, animal or plant life or
118
health. . . .” Nonetheless, it may still be a challenge for the WHO to
develop tobacco control measures that do not conflict with free trade
principles. In order to develop WTO-compliant measures, it is necessary to consider basic principles derived from the language of the
relevant GATT and WTO agreements, as well as the trade cases. The
WTO representative speaking at the Third Session of the Interagency
Task Force identified two principles of free trade that should be considered in order to evaluate health protecting measures: nondiscrimination and necessity.119 This paper adds to this analysis the principle
of reasonableness, given the importance the Dispute Settlement Body
attributed to this factor in the Asbestos and Hormones cases.120 If a
tobacco control measure does not conflict with these three principles
under international trade law, it should not suffer adverse treatment
by the Dispute Settlement Body. A brief review of each of these
principles follows.

117. Report of the Third Session, Global Videoconference (Dec. 8, 2000), United Nations Ad
Hoc Interagency Task Force on Tobacco Control, available at http://tobacco.who.int/en/unitednations/un-reportiii.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2001).
118. WTO Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/1, art. 6 (Nov. 14, 2001), available
at http://www-chil.wto-ministerial.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.pdf (last
visited Nov. 15, 2001).
119. The nondiscrimination test, according to the representative, should consider the principles of most favored nation status and national treatment, while the necessity test “has to do
with the extent to which a measure that is taken by a country to achieve a certain objective is
truly necessary.” Id.
120. The principle of reasonableness is applied in the WTO Asbestos Dispute Settlement
Body Panel Report, supra note 87, ¶¶ 8.193, 8.211; WTO Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 37, ¶ 174; and WTO Meat Hormones Appellate Body Report, supra note 82, ¶ 250.
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A. Nondiscrimination
The obligations under GATT Article I, concerning most favored
nation status, and Article III, regarding national treatment, essentially require that measures do not accord different treatment to like
121
products on the basis of their origin. If there is no discrimination,
122
there is no case against a measure under Articles I and III. However, a tobacco control measure may violate either of those articles
and still survive WTO scrutiny under Article XX(b).123 Because the
chapeau of Article XX also speaks of “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” and “disguised restriction[s] to trade,”124 some measure
of discrimination may be allowed, so long as it is not found to be arbi125
trary or unjustified, or a disguised restriction to trade.
B. Necessity
Assuming that a tobacco control measure relies on the GATT
Article XX(b) exception (or the Article 2.2 exception of the TBT) it
will have to be shown that the measure is necessary to achieve the
126
health objectives in question. It is not clear how the provision will
be applied in future panel and Appellate Body reports. For example,
in the Thailand Cigarettes case, the GATT panel applied it in a man127
ner that was relatively unforgiving of Thai health policy.
Alternatively, in applying the provision in the Asbestos case, the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel implied that a determination of necessity
would not be extensively reviewed, so long as the decision to enact a
measure is motivated by a reasonable determination.128 The trade
cases demonstrate that a measure will usually withstand Dispute Settlement Body necessity analysis if it has the following qualities: (1) it
is aimed at meeting a specific objective; (2) it is the least traderestrictive measure available; and conversely, (3) there are no other

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

GATT, supra note 17.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id; TBT, supra note 18, art. 2.2.
GATT Thailand Cigarettes Report, supra note 53, at 223.
WTO Asbestos Dispute Settlement Body Panel Report, supra note 36, ¶¶ 8.195–8.222.

ECKHARDT_FMT.DOC

2002]

01/24/02 9:25 AM

BALANCING INTERESTS IN FREE TRADE AND HEALTH

217

less restrictive measures available that would meet the same objec129
tive.
C. Reasonableness
In the event that a tobacco control measure relies on the GATT
Article XX(b) exception or the TBT Article 2.2 exception, the Dispute Settlement Body may apply a reasonableness analysis in several
ways. This standard is a relatively easy one to satisfy, and it is noteworthy that the Asbestos panel referred to reasonableness on several
130
points, even considering reasonableness in its analysis of necessity.
If, for example, a measure does impose some kind of discrimination,
reasonableness will be considered in the process of determining
whether the measure is arbitrary or unjustified, or a disguised barrier
131
to trade.
V. POTENTIAL TOBACCO CONTROL MEASURES
A. The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
In the past five years, the WHO has worked to devise a tobacco
control regime, developing the current FCTC and follow-up protocol
strategy.132 The tobacco control regime will be implemented on a
step-by-step basis, starting with a simple framework to be followed by
133
a series of binding protocols. WHO preparatory materials explain
that in the FCTC, “[s]tates . . . [will] adopt a framework convention
that calls for cooperation in achieving broadly stated goals, leaving
open the possibility that the parties to the convention will subsequently conclude separate protocols containing specific measures de129. GATT Thailand Cigarettes Report, supra note 53, at 223; GATT Tuna Dolphin Report, supra note 62, at 191; WTO Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note
68, at 614.
130. WTO Asbestos Dispute Settlement Body Panel Report supra note 36, ¶¶ 164–75,
8.207.
131. GATT, supra note 17, art. XX(b).
132. The World Health Assembly passed a resolution calling for the development of a tobacco control convention on May 25, 1996. International Framework Convention for Tobacco
Control, World Health Assembly, WHA 49.17 (1996).
133. The step-by-step implementation strategy has been used successfully in the case of environmental treaty regimes. See, e.g., Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, May 9, 1992, S. TREATY DOC. No. 102-38, 31 I.L.M. 849; Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-10, 1522
U.N.T.S 3; Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, T.I.A.S.
No. 11,097, 1513 U.N.T.S. 293.
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signed to implement those goals.”134 Specific terms for the protocols,
however, will not be ripe for discussion until the FCTC is signed by
enough countries to enter into force, and negotiations for the protocols commence. The most recent version of the Draft FCTC was re135
leased by the WHO in January 2001.
While it is certain that the
eventual terms of the FCTC may differ from the current draft, the essential provisions pertinent to this discussion likely will not change.
1. The Draft Convention. The Draft Convention currently
lacks a preamble, but the general aim of the FCTC is expressed in Article C, which states that “[t]he ultimate objective of this Convention
and related protocols is to provide a framework for integrated to136
Notably, there is also language in the
bacco control measures.”
Draft FCTC that expresses respect for free trade rules: Article D(5)
on “Guiding Principles” declares that “[t]obacco-control measures
should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimina137
tion in international trade.” The terms of this article bear an obvious resemblance to the language of GATT Article XX(b),138 and
theoretically, Article D(5) should ensure that all enacted tobacco control measures fit within the allowed exception to trade principles.
However, before inquiring into the subject of tobacco control measures that may involve trade law, and possibly require application of
exceptions under the WTO agreements, it will be useful to review the
scope of measures contemplated in the current Draft FCTC.
The Draft FCTC would impose general, nonbinding obligations
on signatory states under Article E, including an obligation to pass
domestic legislation and make public policy according to the terms of
139
Articles F through I cover a variety of measures that
the FCTC.
would serve to reduce the impact of tobacco on public health, through
134. Luk Joosens, Improving Public Health Through an International Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL, TECHNICAL
BRIEFING SERIES, PAPER 2, WHO Doc. WHO/NCD/TFI/99.2, at 15 (1999).
135. Draft FCTC, supra note 6.
136. The text of Article C in its entirety declares:
The ultimate objective of this Convention and of the related protocols is to provide a
framework for integrated tobacco-control measures to be implemented through the
engagement of the Parties in order continually and substantially reduce the prevalence
of tobacco use and thus protect present and future generations from the devastating
health, social, environmental and economic consequences of tobacco consumption and
exposure to tobacco smoke.
Draft FCTC, supra note 6, at 1.
137. Id.
138. GATT, supra note 17, art. XX(b).
139. Draft FCTC, supra note 6, at 2.
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a series of strategies ranging from taxation to regulations to prevent
140
exposure to second-hand smoke. It should be reiterated that while
these articles of the Draft FCTC discuss the following measures, they
do not impose an obligation on signatory states to enact the measures
wholesale. Instead, each signatory will take on a general obligation to
adopt measures “to the extent possible within the means at its disposal and its capabilities.”141 A table describing the substantive tobacco control measures follows.

140. Id. at 3–8.
141. Under the section on general obligations, Article E:2 in its entirety explains that
[t]o this end each Party shall, to the extent possible within the means at its disposal and
its capabilities: (a) establish or, where it already exists, reinforce, and adequately finance a national coordinating mechanism for tobacco control, with inputs from relevant government and civil society sources; (b) adopt legislative, executive and administrative measures and cooperate with other Parties in harmonizing appropriate policies;
(c) reduce tobacco consumption and exposure to tobacco smoke in accordance with
the provisions of this Convention and, as relevant, its protocols.
Id. at 2.
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TOBACCO CONTROL MEASURES INCLUDED IN THE
CURRENT DRAFT OF THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION
142
ON TOBACCO CONTROL
ARTICLE

PROVISION(S)
Price and Tax measures to reduce the demand for tobacco

F

2(a) Prohibition of duty free sales of tobacco
2(b) Imposition of taxes to reduce tobacco consumption
Nonprice measures to reduce the demand for tobacco
1(a) Passive smoking regulations (second-hand smoking)
1(a) Regulations of contents of tobacco products

G

1(a) Regulation of tobacco-product disclosures
1(a) Packaging and labeling
1(a) Education, training, and awareness
1(a) Advertising, promotion, and sponsorship

H

Demand reduction measures concerning tobacco
dependence and cessation
Measures related to the supply of tobacco

I

Points 1 to 7, illicit trade in tobacco (smuggling and
counterfeiting)
Points 8 to 12, elimination of sales to and by young
persons
Points 13 to 15, licensing (of domestic retail sales)

2. Tobacco Control Measures Relating to International Trade
Obligations. The FCTC tobacco control measures from the table
above cover a range of policy issues, several of which would not conflict with free trade principles. For example, if a state signs the FCTC
and a later protocol that expands the general obligation under Article
G:1(a), requiring domestic legislation to protect citizens from secondhand smoke, there could be no trade conflict with another state that
imported tobacco products to that country.143 Measures under Article
H, requiring signatories to organize smoking cessation programs,
144
Such measures
would also be free from scrutiny under trade law.
142. Id. at 3–8.
143. Id. at 3.
144. Id. at 5–6.
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would escape trade law conflicts mainly because they would not be
directed at the products themselves and would place no restrictions
on the sale or import of tobacco products. Having such a secondary
relationship to tobacco products, it would be difficult to demonstrate
that these measures posed any impediment to trade. However, some
of the most effective measures for reducing tobacco consumption
would likely spark controversy. For example, price and tax measures,
such as those described in Article F,145 could generate opposition in
the trade context.146 Mindful of this distinction between tobacco control measures, after passing the FCTC, the WHO will need to consider the merits of promulgating protocols that are less likely to generate controversy under free trade rules.
There are five types of tobacco control measures contemplated
in the Draft FCTC that may generate disputes if a signatory state enacts them voluntarily under the FCTC or by obligation under a fol147
low-up protocol: tax measures under Article F; regulations on the
contents of tobacco products under Article G:1(b);148 regulations on
the packaging and labeling of tobacco products under Article
149
G:1(d); regulations on advertising, promotion, and sponsorship under Article G:2;150 and measures to deter smuggling under Article I.151
Although the Draft FCTC does not contain a requirement that signatory states enact domestic legislation or regulations under Articles F
through I,152 eventual protocols will place binding obligations on signatory states. Therefore, it makes sense to discuss the types of protocols that may follow the FCTC as well as the general progress of the
FCTC. The last section of this paper discusses the five types of tobacco control measures and describes the careful tailoring that will be
necessary in order to avoid controversy or adverse treatment by the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body.

145. Id. at 3.
146. The WHO advocates setting minimum tax rates on tobacco products as a means of deterring consumption, especially among young children, who demonstrate highly elastic demand
for tobacco products relative to price. Luk Joosens, From Public Health to International Law:
Possible Protocols for Inclusion in the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, 78 BULL. OF
THE WORLD HEALTH ORG. 930, 931 (2000).
147. Draft FCTC, supra note 6, at 3.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 4.
150. Id. at 5.
151. Id. at 6–8.
152. Id. at 3–8.
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B. Protocols to the Framework Convention
The WHO has contemplated promulgating a number of protocols to follow the FCTC. For the most part, protocols will expand
upon the issues covered in the Draft FCTC. Potential issues that may
eventually be addressed in follow-up protocols include pricing and
taxes, smuggling, duty-free tobacco, advertising, product testing, la153
beling, and information sharing. At the first meeting of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Body, WHO Director General, Dr. Gro
Harlem Brundtland, mentioned six types of interventions closely related to the issues above that may be developed into protocols: 1) excise taxes; 2) bans on advertising, sponsorship, and marketing; 3) controls on smoking in public places; 4) expanded access to means of
quitting; 5) counter-advertising; and 6) controls on smuggling.154
C. Progress of the FCTC
The WHO declared in its 1999 World Health Report that it plans
155
to adopt the FCTC and key protocols by 2003. It is expected that
the following organs would be formed under the FCTC: a secretariat,
a scientific subsidiary, an implementation mechanism, and a dispute
settlement body.156 The technical aspects of the regime have been discussed at the meetings of a WHO working group established to draft
the FCTC and protocols.157 The latest session of negotiations of the
FCTC intergovernmental negotiating body commenced in April of
158
2001.

153. Joosens, supra note 146, at 930.
154. Gro Harlem Brundtland, Opening Statement, Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control, First Meeting of Intergovernmental Negotiating Body, (Oct. 16, 2000), available at http://
www.who.int/director-general/speeches/2000/20001016_tobacco_control.html (last updated May
15, 2001).
155. THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, supra note 11, at 78.
156. Taylor & Bettcher, supra note 5, at 925–26.
157. When the World Health Assembly formed the Intergovernmental Negotiating Body by
resolution WHA52.18, in 1999, it also formed a working group, which would prepare and draft
language for the FCTC. WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control Report of the
Working Group, WHO Doc. A/53/12 (Apr. 26, 2000).
158. The provisional agenda was released on February 14, 2001. Intergovernmental Negotiating Body on the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, WHO Doc.
A/FCTC/INB2/1 (Feb. 14, 2001).
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VI. DESIGNING MEASURES COMPATIBLE WITH FREE
TRADE OBLIGATIONS
The ultimate success of the WHO tobacco control measures will
depend in part on development of FCTC protocols that are WTOcompliant, and the following measures, which are possible subjects of
FCTC protocols, all have the potential to conflict with free trade
principles. Based on the principles and lessons derived from the
above analysis of international trade rules, recommendations for
drafting WTO-compliant protocols are offered below.
A. Tax Measures
Article F of the Draft FCTC asks signatory states to eliminate
tax-free and duty-free sale of tobacco and, concurrently, to set a tax
rate on tobacco products that will “achieve a stable and continuous
159
reduction in tobacco consumption.”
Theoretically, a protocol on
this issue could make it mandatory to eliminate tax-free and duty-free
sales and might include a schedule of tax rates to be applied to tobacco products. In general, the free trade regime will allow the imposition of taxes, so long as there is not a finding of discrimination between like products on the basis of origin, under the doctrines of most
favored nation status and national treatment. For example, if a tax is
applied evenly on all cigarettes, it would be hard for another country
to charge discrimination. Additionally, taxes are free from the scrutiny that quotas would face under Article XI of the GATT. On the
other hand, under Article XX(b) it is easy to imagine how discrimination between domestic and imported tobacco products would be perceived as “arbitrary or unjustified” or as a “disguised barrier to
trade.” Ultimately, signatories under the future tobacco control regime can enact good faith domestic legislation in order to levy tobacco taxes with little fear of conflict with the free trade rules.

159. Article F of the Draft FCTC in its entirety reads:
(1) The Parties recognize that price measures are an effective mechanism to reduce tobacco consumption, and that progressive harmonization of tobacco product prices is an
important means of discouraging illicit traffic in tobacco products. (2) Each party shall,
to the extent possible within the means at its disposal and its capabilities, adopt legislative, executive and administrative measures, and cooperate with other Parties in harmonizing appropriate tax policies, in order to reduce tobacco consumption and exposure to tobacco smoke. Such measures and policies shall include the following: (a)
prohibition of tax-free and duty-free sales of tobacco products; (b) imposition of taxes
on tobacco products so as to achieve a stable and continuous reduction in tobacco consumption; (c) adoption of other price and tax measures that may be recommended by
the Conference of the Parties.
Draft FCTC, supra note 6, at 3.
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B. Regulation of Contents
Article G:1(b) calls for signatories to cooperate to develop, harmonize, and eventually adopt, standards for “testing and measuring,
160
The
designing, manufacturing and processing” tobacco products.
standards developed for a regulation of contents protocol may have
an impact on trade and will be contested if they are perceived as discriminatory. To survive WTO Dispute Settlement Body scrutiny, a
challenged standard may have to be defended in terms of the GATT
Article XX(b) exception. For example, given the arbitrary nature of
setting specific limits on the nicotine content of cigarettes, a challenging WTO member state may argue that the standard is “arbitrary
and unjustified.” However, if a panel followed the reasoning of the
Asbestos Panel, it might defer to the judgement of the defending
state, especially if that state had adopted an internationally agreed
upon standard.
Because standards are regulated under the TBT agreement, the
imposition of standards on tobacco products may require an alternative analysis. Annex 1 of the TBT agreement explains that regulations on product characteristics are “technical regulations,” which are
161
The essential elements of the
governed by the TBT agreement.
GATT Article XX(b) exception are also present in the TBT agreement, and it is likely that good faith tobacco control standards or
regulations would survive TBT review. Article 2.2 of the TBT agreement allows “technical regulations . . . not . . . more trade-restrictive
than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective, taking account of the
risks non-fulfillment would create” assuming that the risk assessment
takes available scientific and technical information into account.162
160. Article G:1(b) of the Draft FCTC in its entirety reads:
(1) Each Party shall, to the extent possible within the means at its disposal and its capabilities, adopt legislative, executive and administrative measures, and cooperate with
other Parties in harmonizing appropriate non-price policies, in order to reduce tobacco
consumption and exposure to tobacco smoke. Such measures and policies shall include the following: . . . (b) adoption of standards for testing and measuring, designing,
manufacturing and processing such products, and cooperation in the development and
harmonization of such standards under the auspices of the World Health Organization.
Draft FCTC, supra note 6, at 3.
161. TBT, supra note 18.
162. The full text of Article 2.2 of the TBT provides:
Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted, or applied
with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international
trade. For this purpose, technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than
necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfillment
would create. Such legitimate objectives are, inter alia: national security requirements;
the prevention of deceptive practices; protection of human health or safety, animal or
plant life or health, or the environment. In assessing such risks, relevant elements of
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The protection of human health or safety is listed among the “legiti163
mate objectives.” The necessity issue is present here, just as in Article XX(b), and reasonableness can be shown by satisfying the requirement that the risk assessment has a scientific basis and by
showing that the objective of the regulation is to protect health. Under the TBT agreement, just as with the Article XX(b) exception, discrimination is not an issue, so proof of discrimination does not result
in a defeat of a health measure. Thus, the dispositive issues derived
from the agreement are reasonableness and necessity.
It should also be noted that the FCTC actually will fortify a
state’s prerogative to enact regulations, because such regulations
would not be unilateral, but rather a product of an international
agreement. The language of Article 2.4 of the TBT agreement reveals this favorable view of international standards, in that it requires
WTO member states to base their standards on international stan164
dards, when it is reasonable and when they are available. Likewise
the opinion of the Appellate Body in the Meat Hormones case demonstrates a procedural advantage for measures based on international
standards: “Such a measure enjoys the benefit of a presumption (albeit
a rebuttable one) that it is consistent with the relevant provisions of the
SPS Agreement and of the GATT 1994.”165 In the Meat Hormones
case, the SPS Agreement was in question, but ostensibly the same principle would apply to the TBT agreement. The Meat Hormones case
presents an additional lesson to drafters of a FCTC regulations protocol: the Dispute Settlement Body will defer to a reasonable policy decision to protect health so long as the decision is based on a scientific risk
assessment. Given the wealth of scientific evidence that tobacco is detrimental to health, it will be easy to show that regulations on the contents of tobacco products are based on a scientifically sound basis.

consideration are, inter alia: available scientific and technical information, related
processing technology or intended end-uses of products.
TBT, supra note 18, art. 2.2.
163. Id.
164. Article 2.4 in its entirety reads:
Where technical regulations are required and relevant international standards exist or
their completion is imminent, Members shall use them, or the relevant parts of them,
as a basis for their technical regulations except when such international standards or
relevant parts would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfilment of the
legitimate objectives pursued, for instance because of fundamental climatic or geographical factors or fundamental technological problems.
TBT, supra note 18, art. 2.4.
165. WTO Meat Hormones Appellate Body Report, supra note 82, ¶ 17.
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C. Packaging and Labeling
The Article G:1(d) provision of the Draft FCTC calls for adop166
tion of packaging and labeling requirements. The TBT agreement
will also apply in the case of disputes regarding these measures, as it
would with measures regarding regulation of contents of tobacco
products. Annex 1 of the TBT agreement also defines packaging and
labeling regulations as “technical regulations” and as a result, these
requirements will be analyzed in a manner similar to that which
would be applied to assess regulations on the contents of tobacco
products.167 In general, imposition of labeling requirements should be
relatively uncontroversial in terms of trade law. In its report, the
Thailand Cigarettes panel even went so far as to explicitly declare:
Other countries [have] introduced strict, non-discriminatory labelling [sic] and ingredient disclosure regulations which [allow] governments to control, and the public to be informed of, the content
of cigarettes. A non-discriminatory regulation implemented on a
national treatment basis in accordance with Article III:4 requiring
complete disclosure of ingredients, coupled with a ban on unhealthy substances, would be an alternative consistent with the
168
General Agreement.

D. Advertising, Promotion, and Sponsorship
The World Bank reports that comprehensive bans on advertising
of tobacco products could reduce tobacco consumption in high169
income countries by more than six percent. Article G:2 of the Draft
FCTC lays out a plan to commit signatories to phase out commercial
marketing of tobacco products. In terms of trade law, such bans are
also relatively uncontroversial, and so long as they meet tests for
nondiscrimination, an Article XX(b) defense may not even be necessary. Again, in the Thailand Cigarettes case, the panel laid out a
roadmap for a defense of restrictions on tobacco advertising:
A ban on the advertisement of cigarettes of both domestic and foreign origin would normally meet the requirements of Article III:4.
It might be argued that such a general ban on all cigarette advertising would create unequal competitive opportunities between the
existing Thai supplier of cigarettes and new, foreign suppliers and
was therefore contrary to Article III:4. Even if this argument were
accepted, such an inconsistency would have to be regarded as un-

166.
167.
168.
169.

Draft FCTC, supra note 6, at 4.
TBT, supra note 18, art. G:1(d).
GATT Thailand Cigarettes Report, supra note 53, at 224.
CURBING THE EPIDEMIC, supra note 1, at 50.
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avoidable and therefore necessary within the meaning of Article
XX(b) because additional advertising rights would risk stimulating
170
demand for cigarettes.

Notwithstanding the fact that international trade law allows restrictions on advertising, principles of free expression, which are constitutionally protected in many countries, may make it difficult to enact
advertising bans. For example, the Canadian Supreme Court overturned a general ban on tobacco advertising in 1995, as did the Euro171
In the United States, the
pean Court of Justice in October 2000.
Supreme Court recently upheld certain restrictions on sales of tobacco enacted in the state of Massachusetts, but found that the Massachusetts ban on outdoor tobacco advertising, such as billboards, was
a violation of First Amendment freedom of expression rights.172
E. Smuggling
Article I of the Draft FCTC regarding “[m]easures related to the
supply of tobacco” focuses on the illicit trade of tobacco products, in173
cluding smuggling and counterfeiting. Section 2 of the article provides additional guidance to help avoid conflicts with trade law, declaring, “[t]he Parties agree that measures to this end shall be
transparent, non-discriminatory and implemented in accordance with
their international obligations.”174 Section 3 imposes obligations that
are uncharacteristically mandatory for the Draft FCTC, declaring that
parties “shall adopt” measures to ensure that tobacco products are
packaged with relevant information that would allow for tracing the
path of smuggled cigarettes.175 Section 5 imposes additional mandatory obligations on signatories to increase vigilance on cross-border
tobacco trade and to enact or to strengthen criminal penalties for trafficking in smuggled tobacco products.176
Of the Draft FCTC obligations discussed in this section, the obligations regarding illicit trade in tobacco are the least controversial

170. GATT Thailand Cigarettes Report, supra note 53, at 224 (citations omitted).
171. RJR-Macdonald Inc. v. Canada, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 (Can.); Federal Republic of Germany v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2000 ECJ CELEX LEXIS
1846 (2000).
172. Lorillard Tobacco Company v. Reilly, 121 S.Ct. 2404 (2001).
173. Article I:1 explains that “[t]he Parties recognize that the elimination of all forms of illicit trade in tobacco products, including smuggling and counterfeiting, is an essential component of tobacco control.” Draft FCTC, supra note 6, at 6.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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because trade law does not require that states abandon regulation of
imports entirely, and principles of free trade do not protect otherwise
illegal activity. Nevertheless, some of the anti-smuggling measures
would impose packaging requirements, and the TBT agreement
might be pertinent in a dispute over such requirements. Therefore,
standard issues of discrimination, reasonableness, and necessity could
be subject to analysis.
VII. CONCLUSION
In spite of popular skepticism about the current free trade regime enforced by the WTO, there is ample evidence that the WTO
agreements do not preclude the WHO’s development of the Framework Convention for Tobacco Control or the follow-up protocols. In
fact, a review of trade law principles shows that the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body likely would uphold internationally developed
measures on tobacco control. The language used in the GATT panel
and WTO Dispute Settlement Body reports should encourage promoters of tobacco control. Recall, for example, the declaration of the
panel in the Thailand Cigarettes case that “smoking constitute[s] a serious risk to human health and that consequently, measures designed
to reduce the consumption . . . [fall] within the scope of Article
XX(b).”177 Given the free trade regime’s demonstrated enthusiasm
for the principles of international cooperation and recently demonstrated respect for good faith trade-restricting measures aimed at protecting human health, it seems certain that WTO-compliant tobacco
control measures can be devised. However, that is not to say that the
WTO will not vigorously defend free trade principles. Review of
trade cases shows that the WTO Dispute Settlement Body will not
hesitate to strike down measures designed to protect the environment
or health if it finds they do not comply with trade rules. With this in
mind, promoters of the tobacco control regime must take care to develop the FCTC, and especially the protocols, in a way that avoids
trade disputes. Ultimately, it will be the individual states that are
both party to the tobacco control regime and to the WTO that will actually run the risk of facing adverse Dispute Settlement Body judgments. However, the WHO is the architect that bears the responsibility for designing effective, WTO-compliant, tobacco control
measures. The task will require care, but nevertheless, there are good

177. GATT Thailand Cigarettes Report, supra note 53, at 222–23.
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prospects for the development of a tobacco control regime that works
in harmony with free trade rules.
Joseph N. Eckhardt

